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Nowadays, it is a truism that hypotheses and theories play an essential role in scientific practice. This, however, was far from an obvious given in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy. Different natural philosophers had different views on the role and status of hypotheses and theories, ranging from fierce promotion to bold rejection, and to both they ascribed varying meanings and connotations. It was a time of epistemological and methodological transformation, in which a clear divide between philosophers and ‘scientists’ was still absent.​[1]​ Knowledge was in a twofold flux: novel discoveries were incessantly made and innovative accounts of the extent and status of human knowledge together with methods of how to acquire knowledge about the empirical world rapidly emerged.​[2]​ 
The guiding idea of this chapter is that, in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy, the terms ‘hypothesis’ and ‘theory’ and their cognates were imbedded in a semantic network of interconnected epistemological and methodological notions – such as ‘knowledge’, ‘method’, ‘probability’, ‘certainty’, ‘induction’, ‘deduction’, ‘experimental philosophy’, ‘speculative philosophy’, and the like) (cf. Anstey 2005, pp. 220-221). As these semantic networks changed overtime, the meaning and significance of ‘hypothesis’ and ‘theory’ likewise shifted. Without pretence of completeness, this chapter provides a chronological treatment of some of the defining moments in the semantic transformation of these two terms within the context of seventeenth-century natural philosophy.​[3]​

2. Bacon: From Particulars to Axioms

Bacon’s project of reform was to be founded on ‘natural and experimental history’, i.e. on a detailed survey of specific phenomena as they occur in the spontaneous course of nature, on the one hand, and on a systematic experimental study of nature ‘under constraint and vexed (natura constricta et vexata)’, i.e. nature ‘when forced out of her natural state by art and the hand of man, and squeezed and moulded (cum per artem et ministerium humanum de statu suo detruditur, atque premitur et fingitur)’, on the other (Bacon 1887-1901, 8, p. 48 [= ibid., 1, Instauratio magna, Distributio operis, p. 222]).​[4]​ His aim was to arrive, not at pretty and probable conjectures, but at certain and demonstrable knowledge (‘non belle et probabiliter opinari, sed certo et ostensive scire’) of the interior and remote parts of nature and of the causes or ‘forms’ (formae) of things (Bacon 1887-1901, 1, Inst. magn., Praef., p. 237, I.xviii, p. 245, and I.lxx, p. 276).​[5]​ Once both a natural and experimental history is established, we systematically arrange the information obtained by means of Bacon’s three inductive tables which initiated a process of eliminative induction. Bacon assumed that this process of eliminative induction would continue until one nature remains: the ‘the solid, true and well-defined’ cause (ibid.).
According to Bacon, traditional learning was filled with premature theorizing, i.e. with speculation about the causes of things independent of systematic observation–experimentation and eliminative induction. In this context, he frequently used ‘theory’ synonymous to ‘speculation’, ‘dogma’, ‘doctrine’, or ‘fable’.​[6]​ By contrast, proper speculative or theoretical knowledge is knowledge – based on empirical knowledge and established by a methodized process of eliminative induction – about abstract entities, i.e. causes, that are removed from ordinary experience.​[7]​ Bacon divided natural philosophy into a ‘speculative’ (or ‘theoretical’) part and an operative part. The former corresponds to the inquisition of causes (Inquisitio Causarum); the latter to the production of effects (Productio Effectuum). The speculative part of natural philosophy is in its turn divided into physica, which deals with those causes that are transitory (i.e. with efficient and material causes), and metaphysica, which deals with those causes that are abstract and fixed (i.e. with final causes and the forms of things) (ibid., 2, Inst. magn., De dig. et augm. sc., III.iv, p. 264; ibid., 4, The Adv. of Learn., II.x-xiii, pp. 215-228). ‘Physic’ is based on natural history and stands between natural history and ‘metaphysic’, which is in its turn based on natural history and ‘physic’. Natural history describes the variety of things, ‘Physic’ their variable causes; and ‘Metaphysic’ their fixed and constant causes so that each higher-level branch of knowledge entails a higher degree of abstraction (ibid., 6, The Adv. of Learn., II, p. 218).​[8]​ According to Bacon, ‘speculative’ knowledge, i.e. knowledge about causes, is the outcome of a gradual and methodized process of generalization and increasing abstraction from the immediate information provided by the senses. Bacon did not see proper speculative knowledge as antithetical to observational-experimental knowledge, rather he saw proper speculative knowledge as the methodized outcome of observational-experimental knowledge (Anstey 2005, pp. 216-217).
Bacon closely associated ‘hypotheses’ with specific mathematical models in astronomy. According to Bacon, defenders of such astronomical models do not assert anything actually true of celestial bodies, but merely seek to introduce some mathematical rules that are convenient for calculations and the construction of astronomical tables (Bacon 1887-1901, 7, Descr. gl. intell., V, p. 296, VII, p. 315; ibid., 7, Thema Coeli, p. 356). According to Bacon, astronomical hypotheses, which he considered as mathematical constructions ‘without any reality in them’ (ibid., VII, Descr. gl. intell., VII, p. 326), do not belong to natural philosophy because they do not deal with the physical reasons or causes of celestial motion (ibid., 7, Thema Coeli, pp. 355-356; ibid., 2, De dign. et augm. sc., I, p. 134, III.iv, p. 264, p. 286; ibid., 5, Cogn. de sc. hum., p. 444). Physical astronomy should aim not only at calculation and prediction, but at a natural-philosophical treatment of the celestial bodies: a treatment, not of “what is accordant with phenomena, but of what is found in nature and is actually and really true (‘non quid phænomenis sit consentaneum, sed quid in natura penitus repertum atque actu et reipsa verum sit’)’, or, in other words, a treatment of ‘their substance, various qualities, powers, and influences, according to natural and certain reasons (substantia quoque et omnimoda qualitate, potestate, atque influxu, (…) secundum rationes naturales atque indubitas)’ (ibid., 7, Descr. gl. intell., V, p. 295). Bacon’s stance on astronomical hypotheses has an important implication: when he observes that both the Ptolemaic and the Copernican​[9]​ system (and, for that matter, alternative mathematical ‘constructions’ that might save the same phenomena) are equally compatible with phenomena (ibid., 6, The Adv. of Learn., II, p. 234; ibid., 7, Descr. gl. intell., V, pp. 295-296; ibid., 7, Redarg. Phil., p. 75), he is not at all asserting that astronomical hypotheses are physically underdetermined, since for him they are purely mathematical.
 

3. Boyle and Hooke: The Fruitfulness of Framing Hypotheses

Undoubtedly, it is correct to claim that Bacon’s call for systematic collection of natural and artificial histories, which were to form a sound foundation for establishing proper theoretical superstructures, was a key source of inspiration for the founding fathers and Fellows of the Royal Society of London.​[10]​ However, rather than providing a definite exposition of the specific precepts of use in natural-philosophical inquiry, Bacon’s philosophy served as ‘a general programme into which a whole range of particular ideas from other sources could fit’ (Hunter 1981, p. 17 [emphasis added]) – thereby leaving considerable room for methodological elaboration, innovation, and to some extent selectivity​[11]​. In this context, the integration of physical hypotheses in natural-philosophical inquiry, which was coextensive with the emergence of a probabilistic view of human knowledge in between dogmatism and radical scepticism (Sprat 1667, p. 101), should be seen as a substantial and original extension to Bacon’s plan of methodological reform.​[12]​ As we have seen in the previous section, Bacon commented rather sparingly on the details of his two scalae. Generations after Bacon had to fill in this lacuna for themselves (cf. Shapiro 1983, p. 49).​[13]​ In doing so, natural philosophers came to ascribe a crucial role to hypotheses in physical inquiry, as the work of Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and Robert Hooke (1635-1703) particularly testifies. Both Boyle and Hooke conceived of hypotheses, which they used synonymously to ‘theories’, as causally sufficient and probable ‘explications’ of natural phenomena that stand in an evidential relation to the matters of fact they serve to elucidate. 

Boyle: Hypotheses as Explications

In line with the Bacon’s programme of reform, the self-acclaimed ‘underbuilder’ of physico-mechanical philosophy and promoter of  a ‘grand Design of promoting Experimental and Useful Learning’ (Boyle, Spring of the Air (1660), B 1, p. 143)​[14]​, Robert Boyle, observed that natural philosophers have ‘too / hastily, and either upon a few Observations, or at least without a competent number of Experiments, presum’d to establish Principles, and deliver Axioms’ (Boyle, Certain Physiological Essays (1661), B 2, p. 13, p. 20).​[15]​ Rather than collecting a body of natural and experimental history on the basis of which ‘a Solid Theory may be / safely built’ (B 4, p. 58), and examining ‘how far the Phænomena are, or are not, capable of being salv’d’ by a particular hypothesis, speculative philosophers have been ‘over-forward to establish Principles and Axioms’ (B 2, p. 14) and have ‘been wont either wholly to neglect Experiments or, if conspicuous ones have been, (as it were) obtruded upon them, have rather accommodated them (and too often wrested them) to their ‹already framd› Theory’s, than regarded them in the framing of their Theory’s: and in a word, have look’d upon them as things, that a speculative wit may, if he please, Adopt, but do’s not Heed’ (B 8, p. 353). The Aristotelians and the School-philosophers make ‘but little use of Experience; contenting themselves for the most part to employ but few and obvious Experiments, and vulgar Traditions, usually Uncertain, and oftentimes False; and superstructing almost their whole Physicks upon Abstracted Reason; by which, I mean, The rational Faculty endowed with its own Congenit or Common Notions and Idea’s, and Popular Notices’ (B 11, p. 292, cf. p. 307). Moreover, rather than enlightening natural phenomena, they introduce ‘Principles readily nam’d, but scarce so much as pretended to be understood’ (B 8, p. 86, cf. B 3, p. 246 and B 8, p. 104) and ‘have their recourse to [Spiritual] Agents [i.e. substantial Forms and real Qualities] that are not onely invisible, but inconceivable (…)’, whereas ‘betwixt visible bodies and Spiritual Beings there is a middle sort of Agents, invisible Corpuscles; by which a Great part of the difficulter phænomena of Nature are produc’d, and by which may intelligibly be / explicated those Phænomena’ (B 6, p. 167). The arguments of mechanical philosophers are founded on intrinsically intelligible notions, such as ‘Local Motion, Rest, Bigness, Shape, Order, Situation, Contexture of Material Substances’ (B 8, p. 105). Virtuosi also make ‘much greater and better use of Experience in their Philosophical Researches. For they consult Experience both frequently and heedfully; and not content with the Phænomena that Nature spontaneously affords them, they are solicitous, when they find it needful, to enlarge their Experience by Tryals purposely devis’d; and ever and anon Reflecting upon it, they are careful to Conform their Opinions to it; if there be just cause, Reform their Opinions by it’ (B 11, p. 292, cf. p. 304).
A hypothesis, Boyle writes, is ‘a supposition (whether true or fals) that men have pitchd upon, or devis’d, as a Principles, ‹by› whose help the phænomeno[n] wherto it is to be applyd may be explicated, that is ‹clearly deducd from causes› understood.’ Furthermore, a hypothesis ‘ought to be more clear & known than the phænomena it is to explain & if it be not intelligible when proposd, it cannot but be useless when applyd, ‹And› to ‹go about› to illustrate the obscure transactions of nature, by an obscure hypothesis, is as improper as to attempt to ‹shew› a man ‹his way› in the dark ‹with› an unlighted torch’ (B 8, pp. 271-272). In similar vein, in his Mechanical Origins of Qualities (1675-1676), Boyle stated that the aim of a hypothesis is ‘to render an intelligible account of the Causes and the Effects or Phænomena propos’d, without crossing the Laws of Nature or other Phænomena’ (B 8, p. 325). ‘[T]he more numerous,’ Boyle added, ‘and the more various the Particulars are, whereof some are explicable by the assign’d Hypothesis, and some are agreeable to it, or at least are not dissonant from it, the more valuable is the Hypothesis, and the more likely to be true’ (ibid.).
Explications of natural phenomena cannot be established a priori (B 8, pp. 114-115)​[16]​ and, rather than demonstrative certainty, they offer moral certainty:

And though the Inferences, as such, may have a Demonstrable Certainty; yet the Premisses they are drawn from having but an Historical one, the / presumed Physico-Mathematical Demonstration can produce in a wary mind but a Moral Certainty, and not the greatest neither of that kind that is possible to be attain’d; as he will not scruple to acknowledge, that knows by experience, how much more difficult it is, then most men imagine, to make Observations about such nice Subjects, with the exactness that is requisite for the building of an undoubted Theory upon them. (B 8, p. 66; cf. B 8, p. 345)​[17]​

Moreover, there is no guarantee that ‘many things may be discover’d in After-times by Industry or Chance, which are not now so much as dream’d of, and which may yet overthrow Doctrines speciously enough accommodated to the Observations that have been hitherto made’ (B 8, p. 89). Boyle conceived of hypotheses as temporary ‘superstructures’, which ‘though they may be preferr’d before any others, as being the least imperfect, or, if you please, the best in their kind that we yet have, yet are they not entirely to be acquiesced in, as absolutely perfect, or uncapable of improving Alternations’ (B 2, p. 14). It is in light of this that we should consider Boyle’s endorsement of the ‘Corpuscularian Hypothesis’​[18]​: he did not conceive of corpuscularianism as a demonstrated principle, but as the best, i.e. most fertile (or heuristically valuable (Anstey 2002), generally applicable, and intelligible hypothesis of natural phenomena virtuosi have hit upon (cf. Sargent 1986, pp. 475-476, Chalmers 1993, p. 547).​[19]​ According to Boyle, the requisites of a good hypothesis are that (i) it is intelligible, (ii) it contains nothing impossible or manifestly false, (iii) it does not suppose anything unintelligible, impossible of absurd, (iv) it is self-consistent, (v) it is ‘fit & Sufficient to Explicate the Phaenomena, especially the chief’, and (vi), it is ‘at lest Consistent with the rest of the Phaenomena it particularly relates to, & do not Contradict any other known Phaenomena of Nature, or manifest Physical Truth’ (B 8, p. 89). The requisites of an excellent hypothesis, furthermore, are that (i) it is ‘not Precarious, but have sufficient Grounds in the nature of the Thing it self, or a lest be well recommended by some Auxiliary Proofs’, (ii) it is ‘the Simplest of all the Good ones we are able to frame, at lest Containing nothing tht is Superfluous or Impertinent’, (iii) it is ‘the only Hypothesis tht Can explicate the Phaenomena, or at lest that does explicate them so well’, (iv) it enables ‘a skilful Naturalist to Foretell Future Phaenomena , by their Congruity or Incongruity to it: and especially the Events of such Expts as are aptly devisd to Examine it; as Things tht ought or ought not to be Consequent to it’ (S, p. 119; Hall 1965, pp. 134-135). According to Boyle’s own standards, the corpuscularian hypothesis will easily pass as a good hypothesis and perhaps even as an excellent hypothesis. It will, however, not satisfy the first, and most rigid, disjunct of the third desideratum for an excellent hypothesis. Because of causal underdetermination, mechanical explanations offer only a sufficient but not a necessary and sufficient account of physical effects: 

And here let us further consider, That as confidently as many Atomists, and other Naturalists, presume to know the true and genuine Causes of the Things they attempt to explicate, yet very often the utmost that they can attain to in their Explications, is, That the explicated Phænomena May be produc’d after such a Manner as they deliver, but not that they really Are so: For as an Articifer can set all the Wheels of a Clock a going, as well with Springs as with Weights, and may with violence discharge a Bullet out of the Barrel of a Gun, not onely by means of Gunpower, but of compress’d Air, and even of a Spring. So the same Effects may be produc’d by divers Causes different from one another; and it will oftentimes be very difficult, if not impossible for our dim Reasons to discern surely which of those several ways, whereby it is possible for Nature to produce the same Phænomena she really made use of to exhibit them. (B 3, pp. 255-256)​[20]​

Just as Bacon had done, Boyle reserved a spot for proper speculative or theoretical natural philosophy. In a manuscript piece dating from ca. 1666, Boyle indicated that the practical or experimental part of natural philosophy, in which the production of effects occupies centre stage, and the speculative part, which addresses the causes of things, might engage in what he considered as a ‘happy Marriage’. The practical or experimental part might assist ‘the speculative Phylosopher, that is solicitous about the causes and reasons of Naturall things’ and ‘the speculative Phylosopher so assisted, may (on the other side) very much improve the Practical part of Physicks’ (B 8, p. 351; cf. Boyle 2001, 3, p. 170). Elsewhere, Boyle was more explicit about this mutual interaction: on the one hand, experimentation was useful to speculative philosophy in that it could: (i) supply and rectify the senses, (ii) suggest hypotheses ‘both more general and particular’, (iii) illustrate explications, (iv) determine doubts, (v) confirm truths, (vi) confute errors, and, (vii) hint to ‘luciferous inquiries and experiments’ and contribute ‘to the making them skilfully’; on the other hand, speculative philosophy is useful to experimentation in that it allows for: (i) devising ‘philosophical experiments, which depend only, and mainly, upon Principles, notions, and Ratiocinations’ and (ii) ‘instruments both mechanical and others to make inquiries and tryalls with’, (iii) varying and improving known experiments, (iv) helping ‘to make estimates of what is physically possible and practicable’, (v) foretelling ‘the events of untried experiments’, (vi) ascertaining ‘the limits and causes of doubtful and seemingly indefinite experiments’, and, (vii) determining ‘accurately the circumstances and proportions, as weight, measures and duration etc. of experiments’ (Royal Society, Boyle Papers, 9, f. 30v [quoted from Sargent 1995, p. 164]).  However, rather than seeing the speculative part of natural part as the eventual outcome of the historical part, as Bacon did, Boyle seemed to stress that both were in continuous interaction.

Hooke: From Hypotheses to True Axioms

‘The truth is’, Robert Hooke (1635-1703) lamented in the preface to the Micrographia (1665), ‘the Science of Nature has been already too long made only a work of the Brain and the Fancy: It is now high time that it should return to the plainness and soundness of Observations on material and obvious things’ (Hooke 1665, [ix]). By endorsing an inadequate method of inquiry, pre-Baconian natural philosophy has established probabilities only, rather than certainty (Hooke 1705, p. 107). Natural philosophers who endorse the traditional way of studying nature have promoted several misguided practices, most notably: they have failed to distinguish between what is true, probable and false (ibid., p. 4)​[21]​; being inclined to ‘Speculation and abstracting’ (ibid., p. 4, p. 8, p. 10), they have proceeded to ‘the most General and Universal Conclusions and Theories’ from ‘a very few uncertain Histories’​[22]​; they have adapted experiments and observations to their hypotheses rather than regulated ‘their Thoughts by them, esteeming their own Understandings to be the Mine of all Science’ (ibid., p. 4); where rectification of a hypothesis is required, they have introduced additional ad hoc hypotheses rather than ‘renewing or Amending the whole’; and, they have relied on syllogism so that ‘their Axioms and conclusions cannot be better than the grounds an Principles from which they were rais’d’ (ibid., p. 5). In line with the Royal Society programme of natural-philosophical reform, Hooke sought to ‘proceed from the real, the mechanical​[23]​, the experimental Philosophy, which has this advantage over the Philosophy of discourse and disputation, that whereas that chiefly aimes at the subtilty of its Deductions and Conclusions, without much regard to the first ground-work, which ought to be well laid on the Sense and Memory; so this intends the right ordering of them all, and the making them serviceable to each other’ (Hooke 1665, [vii]). Correspondingly, Hooke sought ‘to raze the old Pile built upon unstable Fancies and unsound opinions, and to begin a new upon a sure Foundation of Experiments’ (Hooke 1674, p. 43), and, rejected ‘Dogmatizing, and the espousal of any Hypothesis not sufficiently grounded and confirm’d by Experiments’ (Hooke 1665, [iv], cf. [xxxi]) and ‘pre-conceived Theories and Deductions from particular, and seemingly accidental Experiments’(Hooke 1705, p. 280). By reforming philosophy, Hooke remarked, ‘[t]alking and contention of Arguments would soon be turn’d into labours; all the fine dreams of Opinions, and universal metaphysical natures, which the luxury of subtil Brains has devis’d, would quickly vanish, and give place to solid Histories, Experiments and Works’ (Hooke 1665, [xi]).
The aim of natural philosophy, according to Hooke, is ‘to find out a perfect Knowledge of the Nature and Properties of Bodies, and of the Causes of Natural Productions, and this Knowledge is not barely acquir’d for it self, but in order to the inabling a Man to understand how by the joyning of fit Agents to Patients according to the Orders, Laws, Times and Method of Nature, he may be able to produce and bring to pass such Effects, as may very much conduce to his well being in this World’ – hereby Hooke was clearly echoing Bacon’s causal and utilitarian programme of reform (Hooke 1705, p. 3 [italics added]; cf. ibid., p. 330). According to Hooke, natural philosophers will in the long-run​[24]​ be able to provide ‘a certain Theory’ of ‘the inward Texture and Constitution’ of bodies and their ‘Internal Motions, Powers and Energies’ (ibid., p. 3, p. 61)​[25]​ on the basis of a substantial body of natural and experimental history: ‘though the Operations of Nature are more secret and abstruse; and hid from our discerning (…) yet it most probable, by the Effects and Circumstances; that most of them may be capable of Demonstration and Reduction to a certain Rule, as the Operations of Mechanicks or Art’ (ibid., p. 20).​[26]​
Hooke was not only an ‘inquisitive naturalist’: he also reflected on natural-philosophical method – albeit it that he never finished a systematic and complete account on this topic.​[27]​ Hooke’s most detailed – but still rather sketchy and incomplete – exposition of his thoughts on natural-philosophical method can be found in his A General Scheme, or Idea of the Present State of Natural Philosophy (most likely: 1666) which was published posthumously (Hooke 1705, pp. 1-70).​[28]​ In what follows, I will combine material taken from A General Scheme with several of Hooke’s later methodological asides as found among his manuscripts and natural-philosophical works proper. In order to address Hooke’s methodology, it is useful to consider the seven consecutive stages of natural-philosophical inquiry he spelled out in a manuscript dating from 1689. The first three stages are:

[1] Either <first> to define and Reduce to a <geometricall> certainty the Powers and effects <of Naturall bodys> already in part known, by Stating and Limiting them And their proper extents according to Number Weight and Measure
[2] or Els Secondly to Discover some new proprietys Qualifications or powers of Bodys not before taken notice of, by meanes of whereof there might be Administred to an inquiring Naturalist A new medium or meanes to Discover the true essence and Nature of that body
[3] Or thirdly to invent and Exhibit some new artificiall ways and Instruments to inable such as should think fitt to use them, to make more curious and deeper searches into the nature of Bodys and their Operations (Royal Society Classified Papers, XX, no. 77 [quoted from Hunter 2005, p. 107; insertion of numbers added])

In the first stage, empirical givens are quantified, measured, and ‘reduced to Regularity, Certainty, Number, Weight, and Measure; for whereas in the common ways of Ratiocination, Examination and Inquiry, all things are trusted to the immediate Power of the Faculties of the Soul, viz. the bare Senses, Memory and Reason’ (Hooke 1705, p. 34). In the second stage, a ‘Philosophical History’, i.e. ‘a brief and plain Account of a great Store of choice and significant Material and Artificial Operations, Actions and Effects, ranged in a convenient Order’ (Hooke 1665, [xxxiv]), is collected. Hooke stressed that, until the collected ‘Philosophical History’ is ‘pretty much stored with choice and sound Materials, the Work of raising new Axiomes or Theories is not to be attempted, lest beginning without Materials, the whole Design be given over in the middle, for out of this are to be taken the Foundation Stones, on which the whole Structure should be raised’ (Hooke 1705, p. 18, cf. Hooke 1665, [x]). In order to remedy the imperfections of the human mind, Hooke proposed a ‘Hypothetical Scepticism’, whereby we impose upon ourselves a disbelief of all statements ‘that we have already imbraced or taken as a Truth’ and only to accept them again after ‘weighing well all the Arguments and Circumstances that can be alleg’d either for or against them by many Tryals and Experiments and Siftings (…) distinctly and determin’d as can produce sufficient Evidence of Truth’ (Hooke 1705, p. 11 [italics added] and prescribed the use of instruments to assist the senses (Hooke 1665, [vii-viii], [xii], p. 116). For Hooke empirical evidence clearly was the benchmark of proper knowledge. Correspondingly, Hooke defined knowledge ‘in the highest Idea of it’ as ‘a certainty of information of the Mind and Understanding founded upon true and undeniable Evidence.’ ‘True and undeniable Evidence’, he continued, ‘is afforded either immediately by the Sense without Fallacy, or mediately by a true Ratiocination from such Sense’ (Hooke 1705, pp. 330-331). The four stages that follow are:

[4] Or 4ly to invent and search out, by a proper <Synthetick> method of Reasoning from effects to causes such theorys as to me seemed capable to give Instructive Direction for further Examination by experiments, such consequences as by Analyticall Resolution seemd to be the necessary Results of such a theory and conclusion
[5] Or in the 5th place to proceed with the <further> examination of such Experiments in order to the confirmation of the Doctrine propounded if they answered In all particulars to the effects that were expected or to the Amending Limiting and further Restraining therof if somewhat new and not expected occurred thereupon
[6] Or sixtly to Collect such Observations as are Recorded in Naturall Historians and philosophick writers as might give farther confirmation or information concerning the present Inquiry
[7] Or seaventhly to produce such geometricall Demonstrations of asserted proprietys as put the Doctrine beyond further Dispute.  Royal Society Classified Papers, XX, no. 77 [quoted from Hunter 2005, p. 107; insertion of numbers added]

According to Hooke, the two methods of attaining certain knowledge are the ‘Analytick method’, which proceeds deductively ‘from the Causes to the Effects’, and the ‘Synthetick method’ which ascends inductively​[29]​ ‘from the Effects to the Causes’​[30]​: 

The former is the more difficult, and supposes the thing already done and known, which is the thing sought and to be found out; this begins from the highest, most general and universal Principles or Causes of Things, and branches itself out into the more particular and subordinate. The second is the more proper for experimental Inquiry, which from a true information of the Effect by a due process, finds not [sic; misprint for ‘out’] the immediate Cause thereof, and so proceeds gradually to higher and more remote Causes and Powers effective, founding its Steps upon the lowest and more immediate Conclusions. (Hooke 1705, p. 330)

In natural-philosophical enquiry the synthetic method, which proceeds from particulars to general principles, is to be continuously assisted by the analytic method:

Now tho’ in Physical Inquiries, by reason of the abstruseness of Causes, and the limited Power of the Senses we cannot thus reason, and without many Inductions from a multitude of Particulars come to raise exact Definitions of things and general Propositions; yet by comparing of varieties of such Inductions we may arrive to so great an assurance and limitation of Propositions as will at least be sufficient to ground Conjectures upon, which may serve for making Hypotheses fit to be enquired into by the Analytick method, and thence to find out other Experiments or Observations are necessary to be procured for the further progress in the Synthetick, which will questionless so far inform us of the general and universal progress of the Operations of Nature, that nothing but what is really shall be the truth shall be proposed but the absurdity and insufficiency thereof will presently detected and proved. So that tho’ possibly we may not be able to produce a Positive Proof, yet we may attain to that of a Negative, which in many cases is as cogent and undeniable, and none but a wilful or senseless Person will refuse to assent upon it. (ibid., p. 331)

The idea is that the initial inductions established from phenomena by the ‘Synthetick’ method – note that, at this point, the synthesis is not yet completed: the cause of the phenomena at hand is not yet determined – will provide or suggest​[31]​ propositions ‘sufficient to ground Conjectures upon’ (stage 4) which are subsequently tested by the ‘Analytick’ method, i.e. it will be ascertained whether ‘from an Hypothesis being supposed or a premeditated Design, all the Phænomena of the Subject will be a Priori foretold, and the Effects naturally follow as proceeding from a Cause so and so qualified and limited’ (ibid., p. 330). In the analysis we thus establish whether a hypothesis is able ‘to solve all phenomena’ (stage 5). For, as Hooke noted, ‘we are only ascertaind of ye truth or certainty of any axiome merely by the information receiu’d from ye senses’ (quoted from Oldroyd 1980, p. 19). The analytic method, which proceeds hypothetico-deductively, offers a powerful tool to eliminate hypotheses: ‘the Synthetick way by Experiments and Observations, &c. will be very slow if it be not often assisted by the Analytick, which proves of excellent use, even tho’ it proceed by a false position; for that the discovery of a Negative is one way of restraining and limiting an Affirmative.’ (Hooke 1705, p. 330) If a hypothesis is confirmed empirically it is retained and awaits further investigation (cf. stage 7). Hooke closely associated the analytic method to the propounding of ‘Queries’, i.e. specific research questions the inquisitive naturalist seeks to settle by empirical means (ibid., p. 331).​[32]​ Such ‘Queries’ are accompanied by a specification of those observations or experimental outcomes that would answer the question at stake, i.e. a natural philosopher is to specify ‘what Observations, Examinations, or Experiments would seem conducive thereunto, and accordingly under every such Query of Question, he ought to set down the things requisite to be known for the obtaining the full Knowledge of a compleat and full Answer to it’  (ibid., p. 28), on the one hand, and the ‘Instruments, Engines, and Contrivances’ by which they could be produced, on the other (ibid., p. 33). With respect to the sixth stage, Hooke recorded that by consulting the opinions of received hypotheses and theories on the phenomena at hand and by familiarizing ourselves with their proceedings and ratiocinations, ‘the Mind will, by being acquainted with various Conjectures and Solutions of things, be much sooner and better freed from Prejudice; for by discovering experimentally the Errors in this or that Hypothesis, ’twill be much easier taken of from adhering to any, and so enjoy a greater Freedom of perceiving and imbracing Truth’ (ibid., p. 19, cf. pp. 69-70). In the final stage the hypothesis that accounts for all phenomena is established as certain by mathematical demonstration – the specifics on how this is to be performed are lacking.
Hooke was particularly embracive of the use of hypotheses in natural philosophy: hypotheses, which he, like Boyle, did not systematically distinguish from theories, had pedagogical and heuristic value.​[33]​ The fact that hypotheses were used in the process of theory construction did not mean, for Hooke, that the final result would remain conjectural: by systematically exploring and testing hypotheses, including potentially false ones, true axioms are established eventually (Oldroyd 1987, p. 162). 

4. The Method of Hypotheses: Taking Stock 

In Boyle’s and Hooke’s methodological reflections we can trace an important evolution in the concept of hypotheses: while Bacon associated hypotheses primarily with purely mathematical descriptions of (astronomical) phenomena, Boyle and Hooke conceived of hypotheses as physical and causal ‘explications’ of phenomena that are grounded on empirical evidence. The method of hypothesis, as promoted by Boyle and Hooke, put two important questions on the agenda of later generations of natural philosophers: (1) (how) can we license transductive inferences, given the fact that the constituting micro-parts of macroscopic bodies are unobservable? (= the question of transduction)​[34]​, and, (2) what are we to make of conclusiveness of the demonstrations in natural philosophy, given the fact that they are based on causal sufficiency? (= the question of sufficiency). To come to terms with these issues, two significant positions were developed: a critical-philosophical one (Locke) and a natural-philosophical one of methodological reform (Newton).

5. Locke’s Reservations against the Method of Hypotheses and Transduction

‘[T]he age we live in, is not the least knowing’, John Locke (1632-1704) noticed in The Epistle to the Reader to his Essay on Human Understanding (first edition: 1689).​[35]​ While Master-Builders such as Boyle, Sydenham, Huygens, and ‘the incomparable Mr. Newton’ have advanced the sciences, Locke saw himself employed as ‘an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge’, i.e. in examining ‘the Extent of humane Knowledge’ and our abilities of knowing. If men extend ‘their Enquiries beyond their Capacities’, and let ‘their Thoughts wander into those depths, where they can find no sure Footing’, ‘‘tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions, and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism’ (Essay, I. i. 7) Instead of speculating on the physical make-up of the mind, its essence, and the mechanisms by which we come to have sensations by our organs, Locke proposed instead a ‘Historical, plain Method’, by which both the ways in which we acquire the notions we have and their grounds and certainty are scrutinized (Essay, I. i. 2). Our knowledge, although it can progress, cannot exceed our ideas ‘either in extent, or perfection’ (Essay, IV. iii. 6) According to Locke, Knowledge is ‘the [certain] perception of the connection of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas’ (Essay, IV.  i. 2). Knowledge comes in two kinds: Intuitive Knowledge, i.e. the perception of the (dis)agreement of two ideas compared with each other, and Demonstrative Knowledge, i.e. the perception of the (dis)agreement of two ideas by the intervention of other ideas (Essay, IV. xvii. 17). If Knowledge is lacking, only Judgement, i.e. ‘the putting Ideas together, or separating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so’, is at hand (Essay, IV. xiv. 4, cf. IV. xv. 4). (Hypothetical) Judgements are predicated under Probability (or ‘likeliness to be true’) which is ‘nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement, or Disagreement, by the intervention of Proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable [i.e. certain], or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary’ (Essay, IV. xv. 1). In the context of natural philosophy, a hypothesis, for Locke, is a conjecture which postulates unobservable entities for the purpose of explaining processes, events, or changes in those bodies which are accessible by observation.​[36]​
In order to contextualize Locke’s reservations against hypotheses, it is crucial to understand the well-known epistemological distinction Locke introduced between primary and secondary qualities and especially the role played therein by the corpuscular hypothesis.​[37]​ Primary or original qualities are those qualities in bodies that are ‘utterly inseparable from the Body, in what estate soever it be’ (i.e. solidity, extension, figure and mobility); secondary qualities are those qualities that produce ‘various Sensations in us by their primary Qualities’ (i.e. colour, sound, taste, etc.) (Essay, II. viii. 9-10).​[38]​ Humans do not have epistemic access to the primary qualities of bodies: because our senses fail us ‘in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities’ (Essay, II. xxiii. 8, cf. III. vi. 9, 13). Since we have no knowledge beyond experience, we cannot know ‘the internal Constitution, and true Nature of things, being destitute of Faculties to attain it’ (Essay, II. xiii. 32). With respect to real essences we are ‘incurably ignorant’ (Essay, IV. vi. 5) The primary qualities of bodies are ‘too subtile to be perceived’ in practice (Essay, IV. ii. 11). ​[39]​ Although we are ‘not without Ideas of these primary qualities of Bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk, Figure, and Motion, of the greatest parts of the Bodies of the Universe, we are ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects, which we daily see, are produced’ (Essay, IV. iii. 24) Long before the publication of the Essay, Locke had expressed his scepticism on the human ability to know ‘the contrivances by which nature works’ in his medical piece Anatomia (1668) (transcribed in Dewhurst 1963, pp. 85-93). There he noted that ‘after all our porings and mangling the parts of animals we know nothing but the gross parts, see not the tools and contrivances by which nature works’(ibid., p. 87) and, in the context of Thomas Sydenham’s therapeutics,​[40]​ that the small particles in nature are so fundamentally insensible ‘that I thinke noe body will ever hope or defend even by the assistance of glasses or any other invention to come to a sight of them’ (Public Office Record 30/24/47/2, f. 31r-v [quoted from Walmsley 2004, p. 19]). Similarly, in Draft A of the Essay (1671), Locke wrote that ‘I have no knowledg of the modus operandi, the way how these effects are produced (…) because these alterations being made by particles soe small & minute that they come not within the observation of my senses’ (Locke 1990- , 1, p. 31, p. 256). In an entry among his notes, dated 8 February 1677 he wrote: ‘They [natural philosophers] might well spare them selves the trouble of lookeing any farther, they need not concerne or perplex them selves about the originall, frame or constitution of the universe, drawing this great machine into systems or their owne contrivance and building hypothesis obscure and perlexd and of noe other use but to raise disputes and continue wrangling’ (Aaron and Gibb 1936, p. 86, cf. pp. 99-103). For Locke asserting that humans do not have epistemic access to the original qualities of things is equivalent to stating that humans cannot know the real essences of things, i.e. ‘the real Constitution of Substances’ on which the epistemologically accessible nominal essence depends (Essay, III. vi. 2). Nominal essences refer to collections or ‘bundles’ of secondary qualities that have been found to co-exist in substances of the same kind (Essay, III. ix. 13, III. iii. 20). Insofar as natural philosophy attempts to unravel the inner constitutions of things it is speculative, i.e. it goes beyond the things to which we have epistemic access (Essay, IV. xxi. 2). Given Locke’s frequent corpuscular talk when discussing the primary qualities, many scholars have claimed that atomism was the foundation on which the Essay was built (Mandelbaum 1964). Careful scrutiny, however, provides a more nuanced reading: when talking about the primary qualities in corpuscularian terms, Locke was not committing himself to corpuscularianism, rather he used it to illustrate the difference between primary and secondary and to clarify the notion of ‘real essence’.​[41]​ Locke often explicitly distanced himself from the corpuscularian hypothesis:

I have here instanced in the corpuscularian Hypothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Explication of those Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the Weakness of human Understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary Connexion and Co-existence, of the Powers, which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for that is not my business to determine,) our Knowledge concerning corporeal Substances, will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made to see, what Qualities and Powers of Bodies have a necessary Connexion or Repugnancy one with another, which the present State of Philosophy, I think, we but to a very small degree: And, I doubt, whether with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther. (Essay, IV. ii. 11)

In IV.ii. 11 of the Essay, Locke cautioned that ‘I do not say that the nature of Light consists in very round Globules; nor of Whiteness in such a texture of parts as gives a certain Rotation to these Globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of Light, or Colours’ (Essay, IV. ii. 11). Locke granted that the corpuscular hypothesis is intelligible and explanatory, since it postulates microscopic bodies analogous in their interaction to the macro-level bodies that we can observe. The corpuscularian hypothesis is what Locke considered as an ‘analogy’, i.e. a transference of causal structures that hold between observable objects to unobservable objects (Anstey 2003, p. 30). In a note dated on June 26 1681, Locke noted that ‘the knowledge of natural bodys and their operations reaching litle farther then bare matter of fact without haveing perfect Ideas of the ways and maners they are produced nor the concurrent causes they depend on.’ ‘[B]ut’, Locke continued, ‘a man is principally helpd in them by the history of matter of fact and sagacity of enquireing into probable causes and findeing out an analogie in their operations and effects’ (Aaron and Gibb 1936, p. 117). In these matters, analogy is ‘the only help we have, and ‘tis from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability’ (Essay, IV. xvi. 12). In the end, however, Locke rigidly distinguished a hypothesis’ intelligibility from its truth – and in that sense the Essay contained a pertinent criticism to the programme of Boyle and Hooke.
Because of Locke’s characteristic stress on human ignorance and probability, his epistemology came under attack by the Aristotelian philosopher John Sergeant – Locke’s left marginalia in his private copies of Sergeant’s The Method to Science (1696) and Solid Philosophy (1697).​[42]​ Sergeant defended the view that science can only be attained by making the notions which we receive from experience clear and distinct and dividing them according to their ‘intrinsic differences’ so that ‘first principles’, i.e. definitions of these notions that capture their essences, are established from which infallible and certain conclusions are derivable by syllogistic reasoning (Sergeant 1696, p. 5, p. 228, p. 251, p. 256). Thereby Sergeant railed against the ‘Speculative Philosophers’, ‘who pretend to proceed by Reason and Principles’, and the ‘Experimental Philosophers’, who proceed by induction (ibid., [xxix-xxx]). Sergeant also rejected moral certainty, which he considered to be mere uncertainty or ‘Mock-Certainty’ (ibid., pp. 351-[353] [page 353 is numbered incorrectly as 351]). Ultimately, Sergeant considered all science not attained by the method he prescribed as hypothetical: ‘Hypothetical Philosophy, which is grounded on Suppositions; and beggs that such and such things may be yielded and then it will explicate all Nature, is built on meer Fancy, and is unworthy the name Philosophy’ (ibid., p. 172).
Whereas Boyle had stressed the happy marriage between the practical and the speculative part of natural philosophy and whereas Hooke had claimed that by exploring and testing hypotheses true axioms will arise eventually, Locke was – given the empiricist epistemology he developed in the Essay – more sceptical about the usefulness of hypotheses in (natural) philosophy (cf. Yost 1951 and Anstey 2003). In Chapter XII of Book IV, Of the Improvement of our Knowledge, Locke emphasized ‘how little general Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheses laid down at pleasure, have promoted true knowledge’ (Essay, IV. xii. 12). In a letter to Molyneux in 1697, Locke wrote that he had always thought ‘that laying down, and building upon hypotheses, has been one of the great hindrances of natural knowledge’ (Locke to Molyneux, 15 June 1697, Locke 1976-1989, 6, p. 144). Locke, however, granted that hypotheses ‘if they are well made, are at least great helps to the Memory, and often direct us to new discoveries’, but he cautioned that ‘we should not take up any one too hastily, (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do,) till we have very well examined Particulars, and made several Experiments’​[43]​ and that we should take care ‘that the Name of Principles deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful conjecture, such as most (I had almost said all) of the Hypotheses in natural philosophy’ (Essay, IV. xii. 13). Locke was doubtful whether natural philosophy could go beyond natural and experimental histories:

Experience here must teach me, what Reason cannot: and ‘tis by trying alone, that I certainly know, what other Qualities co-exist with those of my complex Idea, v.g. whether that yellow, heavy, fusible Body, I call Gold, be malleable, or no; which Experience (which way ever it prove, in that particular Body, I examine) makes me not certain, that it is so, in all, or any other yellow, heavy, fusible Bodies, but that which I have tried. Because it is no Consequence one way or t’other from my complex Idea; the Necessity or Inconsistence of Malleability, hath no visible connexion with the Combination of that Colour, Weight, and Fusibility in any Body. (…) Our Reasonings from these Ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other Properties in those Masses of Matter, wherein all these are to be found. Because the other Properties of such Bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown real Essence, on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we can go no farther than the simple Ideas of our nominal Essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us but very sparingly any certain, universal, and useful Truths. (…) I deny not, but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments shall be able to see farther into the Nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown Properties, than one, that is a Stranger to them: But yet as I have said, this is but Judgement and Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty. This way of getting, and improving our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience and History, which all that the weakness of our Faculties in this State of Mediocrity, which we are in in this World, can attain to, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science.​[44]​ We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general Knowledge concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several Properties. Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we may draw advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance. (Essay, IV. xii. 9-10 [underscore added])

It is no surprise then that Locke wrote virtually nothing on method.​[45]​ 


6. The Methodological Reaction against the Method of Hypotheses: Newton

According to Newton, a hypothesis is a proposition that is not a phenomenon, nor deduced from any phenomena but assumed or supposed without any experimental proof (Edleston 1969, p. 155).​[46]​ Since hypotheses were antithetical to Newton’s methodological programme of theory construction by ‘deducing causes from phenomena and rendering them general by induction’, it needs to be clarified – at least at an intuitive level – wherein Newton’s methodology differed by the method of (sufficient) hypotheses.​[47]​ In the editorial preface to the second edition of the Principia (1713), Roger Cotes made two points. The first is that empirical confirmation of conclusions derived from a theoretical principle does not by itself guarantee the truth of that principle​[48]​; the second is that Newton’s Principia testifies of a ‘truer philosophy’, in which causes are established that ‘truly exist’ (Principia, p. 386). It seems, therefore, that the theory outlined in the Principia had not only passed the test of empirical verification, but also that it had succeeded in unravelling causes that truly exist. Now, how did Newton’s method differ from the method of hypotheses? The ways in which Newton’s methodology, in the phase of model construction, differs from a hypothetico-deductive method can be summarized as follows:
1. As a way of reducing the risk of arbitrary speculation and the introduction of feigned forces in natural philosophy, Newton demanded that the physical forces producing Keplerian motion should be derived from the laws of motion. 
2. Moreover, not only did Newton require that the forces adduced in natural philosophy should be shown to be sufficient for their effects; he additionally required that these effects should be shown to be necessarily produced by those forces. In other words, Newton demanded that there be a systematic dependency between adduced forces and their effects. In Propositions I-III (Section 2, Book I), Newton dealt with the dynamical implications of Kepler’s second ‘rule’. In Propositions I-II, Newton argued that a centripetal force is a necessary and sufficient causal condition for the planarity of the orbit and Kepler’s area rule, i.e. he argued that the areas of a body described by radii drawn to an unmoving centre of force lie in a fixed plane and are proportional to the times (deductive direction 1; sufficient cause), and, conversely, that a body, which moves along a curved line described in a plane and by a radius drawn to a point describes areas about that point that are proportional to the times, is urged by a centripetal force tending toward that point (deductive direction 2; necessary cause) (Principia, pp. 444-448). Propositions I-II jointly establish that the centripetal force by which a body is to an unmoving centre of force is directed exactly to this centre, if and only if, that body describes equal areas, which lie in a fixed plane, in equal times exactly. The question, then, that Newton is trying to answer in Section 2, Book I, is not so much Which forces entail Keplerian motion?, but rather What are, given the laws of motion, the necessary and sufficient conditions for Keplerian motion? Establishing that inverse-square centripetal forces are the necessary and sufficient conditions for Keplerian motion warrants that, given the laws of motion, Keplerian motion, in general, is produced by inverse-square centripetal forces, and inverse-square centripetal forces alone.
3. In contrast to the hypothetico-deductivist’s attitude towards deviations, according to which deviations are either discarded or explained away by the introduction of ad hoc factors, Newton made discrepancies between phenomena and the mathematical results derived from ideal conditions a focal point of natural-philosophical inquiry. Newton began by establishing the physical conditions under which – according to the laws of motion – exact Keplerian motion would occur, so that each deviation from exact Keplerian motion is an indication that there is an additional force to the one under which exact Keplerian motion would occur. In other words, from the perspective of the laws of motion, any deviation from exact time-area proportionality is seen as an indication that an additional force, not included in our ideal case, is affecting the situation. Deviations thus become indicative of other forces not tracked in our initial approximation. By means of the propositions expressing systematic discrepancies, Newton was able to measure such additional forces and to trace, in Book III, additional physical sources that could account for these discrepancies.
4. In order to back-up his argument for universal gravitation Newton required the demonstration that the overall inverse-square centripetal force exerted by a body results from the composition of each of the individual inverse-square centripetal forces of the particles constituting that body (Propositions LXX-LXXVI, Book I). In this way, transductive inferences could be licensed by Newton’s mathematical demonstrations on the attractive forces of spherical bodies.





During the seventeenth century, British natural philosophy underwent a series of drastic epistemological and methodological transformations. In this chapter, we have mapped out some defining moments of a small area of this complex process of transformation: the changing status of hypothesis and theory. The main contours of the changing status of hypothesis and theory in seventeenth-century British philosophy can be summarized as follows:
Hypotheses played a rather marginal role in Bacon’s methodological thought. Bacon closely associated hypotheses with mathematical models in astronomy, which according to him lacked any physical content. For Bacon ‘theory’, on the one hand, had a pejorative connotation and he closely associated it with ‘dogma’, ‘doctrine’, ‘fable’, and ‘premature speculation (about causes)’. On the other hand, however, Bacon promoted proper theorizing and speculating, i.e. theory and speculation about natural causes which takes a significant body of natural and experimental histories as a starting point.
In the milieu of the Royal Society, hypotheses occupied centre-stage in the Baconian inspired programme of Boyle and Hooke, who used ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ interchangeably. Most importantly, Boyle and Hooke introduced a new meaning to ‘hypothesis’: hypotheses were conceived of as causally sufficient and probable explications of natural phenomena that stand in an evidential relation to the natural phenomena they serve to elucidate. Boyle, who emphasized the continuous interaction between experimentation and the framing of hypotheses, and Hooke, who thought that by successively framing hypotheses true axioms will be established eventually, both agreed that legitimate hypotheses may only be framed once a body of natural and experimental histories is established. For Boyle and Hooke a hypothesis’ (mechanical) intelligibility was strongly correlated with its truthfulness. Boyle’s and Hooke’s embracive attitude towards hypotheses, however, raised two issues that needed to be taken into account by the natural philosophers after them: (1) how can transductive inferences be licensed given the fact that the small constituting micro-parts of macroscopic bodies are hidden from our senses?, and, (2) what are we to make of conclusiveness of the demonstrations in natural philosophy, given the fact that they are based on causal sufficiency?
In an attempt to address these issues, two significant positions were developed. Locke was critical of Boyle’s and Hooke’s identification of a hypothesis’ intelligibility and its truthfulness. Because the primary qualities of natural bodies cannot be perceived, Locke concluded that natural philosophy cannot be made a science, i.e. that it is predicated under probability. Locke was sceptical about the usefulness of hypotheses and advised to stick to careful collecting of natural and experimental histories. For Newton, the two issues mentioned above, were not at all a reason to succumb: in fact, they motivated him to develop a demonstrative methodology that was not vexed by these problems. Newton’s methodology thereby set out to establish necessary and sufficient causes of natural phenomena in such a way so that transductive steps could be justified. Newton systematically distinguished hypothesis/speculation from theory: a theory is a general proposition established according to his demonstrative methodological desiderata; hypotheses are general propositions not established by Newton’s method of deducing causes from phenomena and rendering them general by induction.
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^1	  On the absence of a clear differentiation between philosophy and ‘science’ see: Lüthy 2000.
^2	  On method see: Dear 2003.
^3	  See Brading 1999 for one of the few chronological analyses of the status of hypothesis and theory within the context of seventeenth-century natural philosophy are available.
^4	  According to Bacon, nature exists in three states: nature in its free and ordinary course (species), nature forced out of her natural state by violent impediments (monstra), and nature constrained and moulded by art and human ministry (artificialia) (ibid., 2, Inst. magn., Parasceve, i, p. 47). On Bacon and the maker’s tradition, see Pérez-Ramos 1988, esp. chapters 5 and 13 and, Pérez-Ramos 1996. On Bacon, see furthermore chapter 3 by Guido Giglioni and chapter 6 by Mary Domski.
^5	  It is important to stress that Bacon did not conceive of forms as formal causes; rather, they refer to the universal and fundamental laws which govern and constitute simple natures (Bacon 1887-1901, 1, Inst. magn., Nov. Org., II.xvii, p. 385).
^6	  In his philosophical works Bacon, for the most part, used ‘theory’ (‘theoria’) in a pejorative sense. See, most notably: ibid., 2, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, I, p. 146, III.iv, p. 286; ibid., The Advancement of Learning, I, p. 127, II, p. 265; ibid., 3, De dign. et augm. sc., VIII.ii, p. 91; ibid., 4, Sylva Sylvarum, To the reader, p. 155, IV, p. 315, VII, p. 460; ibid., 5, Cognitationes de scientia humana, p. 440, p. 444; ibid., 6, Valerius Terminus, p. 65; ibid., 7, Temporis partus Masculus, I, p. 17, II, p. 21, pp. 24-25; ibid., 7, Redurgatio Philosophiarum, pp. 74-75, p. 81; ibid., 7, Cogitata et Visa, p. 118, p. 120, p. 138; ibid., 7, Filum Labyrinthi, p. 166; ibid., 7, Descriptio globi intellectualis, V, p. 294; and ibid., 7, Thema coeli, p. 355.
^7	  Later Sprat also distinguished between presumptuous, or a priori, speculation practised by the ‘Formal man’ and ‘solid speculation’, i.e. a posteriori speculation (Sprat 1667, p. 107, p. 341). Joseph Glanvill famously opposed to the possibility of proper speculative knowledge: the senses are inherently deceptive and the causal connections between things are in itself insensible (Glanvill 1661, pp. 189-192, p. 210). Therefore, hypotheses are only jugded on their capacity ‘to solve the phenomena’ and on their everyday utility (ibid., p. 57, p. 212). Thomas White (1593-1676) composed an Aristotelian answer against Glanvill’s The Vanity of Dogmatizing (White 1665). 
^8	  Bacon denounced discoursing of final causes in empirical research.
^9	  Bacon accused Copernicus of not caring about the fictions he introduced into nature, provided that his calculations answer (Bacon, 1887-1901, 7, Descr. gl. intell., VI, p. 304).
^10	  On the early Royal Society’s Baconianism, see: Hunter 1989.
^11	  As we shall see, both Boyle and Hooke paid little or no attention to eliminative induction.
^12	  On the emergence of probability and ‘mitigated scepticism’, see furthermore: Popkin 2003 and Van Leeuwen 1963. On probable opinion see chapter 20 by James Franklin. The reader should be aware that even until the end of the seventeenth century many Aristotelian philosophers did not accept Bacon’s programme of reform and continued to embrace syllogism as the only valid way to establish knowledge (on seventeenth-century Aristotelianism, see furthermore chapter 12 by Cees Leijenhorst). In the preface to his The Method to Science, John Sergeant (1623-1707), for instance, wrote as follows on Bacon: ‘For, if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ, we shall find that it is, (as he calls it) meerly Historical, and Narrative of Particular Observations; from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick and Common Sense’ (Sergeant 1696, [lviii]). On Sergeant, see furthermore: Krook 1993 and Southgate 2001. Also, many of them did not accept probabilism.
^13	  E.g., in a manuscript related to The Usefulness of Natural Philosophy, Boyle noted that Bacon ‘has mentioned a Scala ascensora & descensoria; the former from Experiments to Axioms, the latter from Axioms to Experiments, as designed parts of his Novum Organum. But that great Genius prevented by Death, having given us nothing of such desirable pieces, but the names, as none has since undertaken to perfect what so great a Master left unfinished’ (B 8, p. 351).
^14	  On the recent scholarly attention drawn to Boyle’s Baconianism, see: Hunter 2007, Knight and Hunter 2007, and, Anstey and Hunter 2008 (which contains ample discussion of the Baconian underpinnings of Boyle’s views on compiling a ‘Naturall History’). Such studies have tempered Laudan’s claims on the methodological dominance of Descartes on Boyle’s natural philosophy (Laudan 1981, chapter 4).
^15	  Similar Baconian-inspired concerns were also raised by Henry Power (1626-1668), Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), and Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680) (Power 1664, p. 193, Sprat 1667, pp. 17-18, p. 31, p. 35, p. 38, p. 101, Glanvill 1668, p. 87, p. 87, p. 91, p. 112, p. 118). Boyle stressed that the framing an explanatory hypothesis/theory ought to be grounded on a previously established body of natural and experimental histories. In the preface to his Defence Against Linus (1662), for instance, Boyle stated that it was not his aim ‘to establish Theories and Principles, but to devise Experiments, and to enrich the History of Nature with Observations faithfully made and deliver’d; that by these, and the like Contributions made by others, men man in time be furnish’d with a sufficient stock of Experiments to ground Hypotheses and Theorys on’ (B 3, p. 12). In his writings, Boyle consistently distinguished between what was historical and pertained to ‘matters of fact’ and what was speculative, conjectural or probable and was situated at the level of causal inquiry (e.g., B 3, p. 121; B 4, p. 5; B 5, p. 296; B 6, p. 315; B 7, p. 9, p. 11; B 7, p. 383; B 12, p. 13). On the socio-political underpinnings of Boyle’s experimental philosophy, see: Shapin and Schaffer 1985. On Boyle in general see chapter 4 by Jack MacIntosh.
^16	  Boyle compared the process of hitting on a probable explanation of a particular phenomenon to the process of deciphering a secret code: ‘For, though one man by his sagacity have found out the right Key, it will be very difficult for him, either to prove otherwise than by trial, that this or that word is not such as ‘tis ghess’d to be by others according to their Keys; or to evince, à priori, that theirs are to be rejected, and his to be preferr’d; yet, if due trial be made, the Key he proposes, shall be found so agreeable to the Characters of the Letters, as to enable one to understand them, and make a coherent sense of them, its suitableness to what it should decipher, / is, without either confutations, or extraneous positive proofs, sufficient to make it be accepted as the right Key of that Cypher. And so in Physical Hypotheses, there are some that, without noise, or falling foul upon others, peaceably obtain discerning mens approbation onely by their fitness to solve the Phænomena, for which they were devis’d, without crossing any known Observation or Law of Nature.’ (B 8, p. 115, cf. B 5, p. 197, where Boyle contrasts mathematical versus physical demonstrations).
^17	  On Boyle and the extent of human knowledge, see: Wojcik 1997, esp. chapter 7.
^18	  Boyle’s ‘corpuscularianism’, a word of his own coining, was intended to be neutral with respect to the indivisibility of matter, the innateness of motion, the essence of matter and extension, the possibility of a vacuum, and Cartesian vortices (B 5, p. 292). On Boyle’s corpuscularianism see furthermore: Clericuzio 1990, Newman, 1994 and 1996, and Anstey 2002.
^19	  See B 8, pp. 104-105, p. 116 (on its fertility), p. 109 (on its applicability); B 2, p. 88; B 8, pp. 75-76 (on its intelligibility).
^20	  In similar vein, in the Mechanical Origin of Qualities (1675), Boyle wrote: ‘But since, in my Explications of Qualities, I pretend only, that they may be explicated by Mechanical Principles, without enquiring, whether they are explicable by any other; that which I need to prove is, / not that Mechanical Principles are the necessary and onely things whereby Qualities may be explain’d, but that probably they will be found sufficient for their explication.’ (B 8, p. 322).
^21	  Later on in A General Scheme, Hooke noted that ‘[w]heresoever therefore any thing is registred upon Authority of another, there ought to be put in the Margin a C, a P, or a D, according as the Authority is Certain, Probable or Doubtful’ (ibid., p. 63). Hooke consistently delineated what he thought to have established hypothetically as probable causes, i.e. as conjectures or queries, and what he had established as certain and true causes, i.e. as axioms (e.g. Hooke 1661, p. 26, Hooke 1665, [vi], [xi], p. 134, p. 216, p. 240, Hooke 1679, p. 73). Hooke only rarely claimed to have established indubitable conclusions. A notable exception is Hooke’s ‘experimentum crucis to determine between the Tychonick and Copernican Hypotheses’ on the basis of which he demonstrated the necessity of the latter (Hooke 1674, p. 2). The term ‘experimentum crucis’ was first used by Boyle (B 3, p. 50), who derived it from Bacon’s ‘instantia crucis’ (Bacon, 1887-1901, 1, Inst. magn., Nov. Org., II.xxxvi, p. 436).
^22	  Hooke stressed that in order to establish a theory one needs to be ‘well furnish’d with that which the Noble Verulam calls Scalam Intellectus; he must have scaling Ladders, otherwise the steps are so large and high, there will be no getting up them’ (Hooke 1665, p. 93).
^23	  Although Hooke seemed to have accepted certain ‘active principles’ (Henry 1989); for an opposing account, however, see: Ehrlich 1995), he very often associated the intelligibility of a particular hypothesis (or ‘explication’ or ‘theory’) with its mechanical nature. See, e.g., Hooke’s rejection of Henry More’s “Hylarchick Spirit” (Hooke 1677, p. 28, pp. 33-35, p. 40; and, more generally: Hooke 1665, p. 134, p. 220; Hooke 1679, pp. 7-8; Hooke 1705, pp. 75-76, p. 97, p. 116).
^24	  Hooke noted that “a very great Sock of Patience as well as Skill” is required the reveal the proceedings of nature (Hooke 1705, p. 35, cf. p. 70).
^25	  See furthermore: Wilson 1995.
^26	  With respect to unobservables Hooke suggested that ‘the best and utmost we can do towards the discovery of them, is only accurately to observe and examine all those Effects produced by them, which fall within the Power of our Senses, and comparing them with like Effects, produced by Causes that fall within the reach of our Senses, to examine, and so from Sensibles to argue the Similitude of the nature of Causes that are wholly insensible’ (Hooke 1705, p. 165). Boyle also was embracive of transductive reasoning: ‘And therefore to say, that, though in Natural Bodies, whose bulk is manifest and their structure visible, the Mechanical Principles may be usefully admitted, that are not to be extended to such portions of Matter, whose parts and Textures are invisible; may perhaps look to some, as if a man should allow, that the Laws of Mechanism may take place in a Town-Clock, but cannot in a Pocket-Watch’ (B 8, p. 108, cf. p. 16). For further discussion, Chalmers 1993, pp. 548-551.
^27	  See furthermore: Hesse 1966, Hunter 2005, and, Oldroyd 1972 and 1987. 
^28	  In order to remedy the deficiencies associated with pre-Baconian natural philosophy, Hooke sketched what he called a ‘Philosophical Algebra, i.e. ‘an Art of directing the Mind in the search after Philosophical truths’ (Hooke 1705, p. 7), which was based on empirical information provided by the naked senses, instruments or engines which assist the senses, and induction, i.e. by ‘comparing the collected Observations (…) and ratiocinating upon them’ (ibid., p. 36) so as to ‘raise more general Axiomes and for the building of a body of Philosophy’ (ibid., p. 44). Hooke only completed the first part of his Philosophical Algebra which contained a treatment of ‘Preparing the Mind, and Furnishing it with fit materials to work on.’ In its turn this part was divided into three consecutive phases: an examination of the perfections and imperfections of the human mind, a description of a method of making observations and experiments, and, a method for arranging the material gathered previously so that axioms may be established (ibid., pp. 7-8).
^29	  Hooke wrote little on the specifics of the process of induction in natural philosophy. The announced second part of A General Scheme, which has gone lost or which never materialized, was to contain ‘the Rules and Methods of proceeding or operating with this so collected and qualify’d Supellex’ (Hooke 1705, p. 8). On this second part Hooke remarked: ‘But as for the Discovery of the more internal Texture and Constitution, as also for Motion, Energy, and operating Principle of Concret Bodies, together with the Method and Course of Nature’s proceeding in them: These will require much deeper Researches and Ratiocinations, and very many Vicissitudes of Proceedings from Axiomes to Experiments, and from Experiments to Axiomes; and are indeed the Business of the Philosopher, and not the Historian, the Method of which I intend, God willing, to handle in the second part of this Philosophical Algebra; which explains the way of making use of the Penus Analytica, or raising Axiomes, and more general Deductions from a sufficient Stock of Materials collected according to the Method of this first part, with Integrity, Judgment, and Care.’ (ibid., p. 61).
^30	  Hooke’s two methods were modelled on the analysis and synthesis in Greek geometry: in the analysis one reasons from assumed theorems to known theorems; in the synthesis from known theorems to the theorems one seeks to establish (Hesse 1966, p. 82). Hooke thereby reversed the common association of analysis with a process proceeding from effects to causes and synthesis with a process from causes to effects (Ducheyne 2005b).
^31	  Hooke did not provide further details on this process.
^32	  Compare Bacon, 1887-1901, 2, Parasc., p. 57; ibid., 7, Descr. gl. intell., VII, pp. 297-298. See further: Boyle to Oldenburg, 13 June 1666 (Boyle 2001, 3, p. 173) and Sprat 1667, pp. 155-156.
^33	  Cf. Boyle: ‘The reason then why I propose a short survey of the several Hypotheses of Philosophers, is, partly, because the knowledg of differing Theorys, may admonish a man to observe divers such Circumstances in an Experiment as otherwise ‘tis like he would not heed; and sometimes too may prompt him to stretch the Experiment farther then else he would (and so make it produce new Phænomena) & partly because these additional Phænomena, and accuratenes which these Theorys will ingage the Experimenter to imploy about some Circumstances, will conduce to make the History both more exact /p. 5/ and compleat in it self, and more ready for use, and more acceptable to those that love to discourse upon Hypotheses, because they will find those Circumstances set down, the omission whereof they would reprehend, as thinking the tryal or Observation of such a Circumstance, necessary or sufficient to prove or to invalidate this or that particular Hypothesis or Conjecture.’ (Boyle to Oldenburg, 13 June 1666, Boyle 2001, 3, p. 171).
^34	  See footnote 26.
^35	  Here I deal only with aspects of Locke’s epistemology in insofar as they are relevant for contextualising his claims on hypotheses. See furthermore chapter 18 by James G. Buickerood.
^36	  Locke rarely used the term ‘theory’.
^37	  Locke did not believe that all natural processes could be explained mechanically (Essay, II. Xxiii. 24-28). See furthermore: Wilson 1979.
^38	  On the connexion between the primary and secondary qualities, Locke remarked: ‘[O]ur Minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of Bodies and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules of the Consequence or Co-existence of any secondary Qualities, though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible Parts which immediately produce them.’ (Essay, IV. viii. 13).
^39	  On the importance of ‘in practice’, see Downing 1992.
^40	  Sydenham (1624-1689) and Locke worked together in London (see Walmsley 2004 and especially Anstey and Burrows 2009 for an account of the interaction of Sydenham and Locke). Locke was particularly appreciative of Sydenham’s approach in medicine: ‘That which always thought of Dr. Sydenham living, I find the world allows him now he is dead, and that he deserved all that you say of him. I hope the age has many who will follow his example, and by the way of accurate practical observation, as he has so happily begun, enlarge the history of diseases, and improve the art of physick, and not by speculative hypotheses fill the world with useless, tho’ pleasing visions.’ (Locke to Molyneux, 1 November 1692, Locke 1976-1989, 4, pp. 563-564, p. 563 [italics added]; cf. Locke to Molyneux, 20 January 1693, ibid., 4, pp. 629-630).
^41	  Downing 1998, esp. pp. 403-404, McCann 1994, esp. pp. 66-67. Other papers that have contributed to this trend are: Downing 2001, Jacovides 2002, McCann 1998, and Walmsley 2004, esp. p. 37. The reader should be aware that, although all these authors agree in tempering Locke’s commitment to corpuscularianism, there are relevant differences in their readings of Locke which cannot be discussed here.
^42	  On Sergeant see footnote 12 above. For discussion of Locke’s marginalia in his private copies of Sergeant 1696 and 1697, see J.W. Yolton 1956. Locke’s marginalia will be available on The Digital Locke Project website in the near future (URL=<www.digitallockeproject.nl>).
^43	  An additional desideratum which Locke mentions elsewhere in the Essay is that one ‘ought to build his Hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his Hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so’ (Essay, II. i. 10). For men ‘who confine their Thoughts to any one System, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the Perfection of any received Hypothesis’ are prone ‘to be persuaded, that the Terms of that Sect, are so suited to the Nature of Things, that they perfectly correspond with their real Existence’ (Essay, III. x. 14).
^44	  Essay, IV. iii. 29, cf. IV. iii. 26. Locke was sceptical about on the possibility of speculative natural philosophy, i.e. that part of natural philosophy that goes beyond natural and experimental history. In a letter on education to Edward Clarke in 1686, Locke noted: ‘Natural philosophie as a speculative science I thinke we have none and perhaps may thinke I have reason to say we never shall. The works of nature are contrived by a wisdome and operate by ways too far surpasseing our facultys to discover or capacitys to  conceive to be ever reduced into a science.’ (Locke to Edward Clarke, 29 January/8 February 1686, Locke 1976-1989, 2, pp. 770-788, p. 785). This was later incorporated into Some Thoughts concerning Education (Locke 1989), pp. 244-245). The only exception Locke was willing to accept was Newton’s Principia (ibid., pp. 248-249).
^45	  Pace Farr 1987, Locke’s short essay entitled ‘Method’ from the 1690s does not concern our knowledge of substances.
^46	  On Newton see chapter 5.
^47	  Within the context of this chapter, I shall focus only on some relevant features of Newton’s complex methodology. A fuller exposition of Newton’s methodology is given in my book-in-progress, currently entitled “The main Business of Natural Philosophy”: Isaac Newton’s Natural-Philosophical Methodology. See furthermore: Ducheyne 2005a, Harper 2002 and Smith 2002.
^48	  Cf.: “For even if these philosophers could account for the phenomena with the greatest exactness on the basis of their hypotheses, still they cannot be said to have given us a true philosophy and to have found the true causes of the celestial motions until they have demonstrated either that these causes really do exist or at least that others do not exist.” (Principia, p. 393).
^49	  For a discussion of Newton’s regulae philosophandi the reader is referred to chapter 5 and to Ducheyne 2009.
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